Abstract-Autonomous underwater vehicles are gaining acceptance in a number of applications and countries, as a safe, cost-effective and reliable alternative to manned or remotely controlled systems. However, the actual autonomy of these vehicles is limited in many ways, restricting their potential uses. Further advances in AUV autonomy will enable new operations, such as very long endurance missions (weeks), and operations in unknown areas. While some experimentation is already taking place with e.g. under ice operations, the chance of failure is unacceptably high for many potential users. De-risking of longendurance autonomous operations in unknown areas is thus an important goal for the AUV community. This paper gives an overview of the AUV research being carried out towards this end at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.
I. INTRODUCTION After decades of research and development, autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) are today becoming accepted by an increasing number of users in various military and civilian establishments. The world's major AUV manufacturers have sold more than 100 such vehicles throughout Europe, Asia and America during the last 10 years. The HUGIN 1000 and 3000 AUV classes, developed by the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment (FFI) and Kongsberg Maritime [1] , account for 25 of these.
The level of autonomy achieved by AUVs is chiefly determined by their performance in three areas: * Energy autonomy * Navigation autonomy * Decision autonomy These three areas should be addressed in a balanced fashion. FFI currently pursues an AUV research programme with the goal of facilitating long-endurance missions in unknown areas with no operator supervision or intervention. This requires advances in all three categories of autonomy. Potential uses of this technology includes persistent ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) operations, crossing under the arctic ice cap, covert operations in confined and complex areas, etc. It is certainly possible to attempt such missions with currently existing AUVs -and indeed, it has been attempted. However, the substantial risk of failure today places such operations out of the reach of many potential users; because of the potential cost and/or because failure could mean detection by an adversary.
The following three chapters describe in more detail the three areas of autonomy mentioned above, followed by discussion and conclusions. (Fig. 1) , designed and built 1991-93, had a range capability of more than 1,000 nautical miles (nmi) -two weeks endurance at 3 knots speed [2] . This vehicle was powered by a sea water battery, utilising an electro-chemical reaction between oxygen dissolved in sea water and magnesium [3] . The system was in many ways ahead of its time, as the navigational and decision autonomy were not available to the extent required by the potential applications of this vehicle. A successor to this vehicle has been developed in collaboration with DGA/BEC in France. Named CLIPPER, the new system has a range in excess of 1,600 nmi at 4 knots speed [4] . The current HUGIN vehicles are powered by alkaline aluminium/hydrogen peroxide semi fuel cells or Lithium ion polymer rechargeable batteries, both systems operating at ambient pressure. The Al/H202 semi fuel cell has been used 0-933957-35-1 ©2007 MTS routinely in commercial HUGIN 3000 seabed mapping missions of up to 60 hours at 4 knots speed with a full sensor suite in operation [5] .
In the mid to late 1990s, FFI developed a state of the art aided INS. The system exists both as an off-line tool for simulation and post-processing (NavLab) [7] and a real-time navigation system (NavP) [8] . The latter is also sold as a separate product by Kongsberg, called HAIN, for ROV Lithium based rechargeable batteries were selected for military applications, not least because of their ease of handling and maintenance. Fully loaded with batteries, the HUGIN 1000 AUV has an endurance of 20-24 hours at 4 knots speed. The first HUGIN 1000 vehicle was delivered to the Royal Norwegian Navy (RNoN) in January 2004 [1] . 17 more vehicles have been sold to Norway, Finland, and India.
Perhaps the most promising technology for next-generation long-range AUVs is hydrogen fuel cells. Based on compressed hydrogen in composite cylinders, the system will be bulky, but the weight will be low: The density of a composite gas bottle filled with hydrogen at 450 bar will be comparable to that of the syntactic foam used to provide buoyancy (approximately 500 kg/m3). Hydrogen peroxide is an interesting option as an oxygen carrier.
FFI is experimenting with this technology for AUVs. The technology is mature for large submarines and space applications, but a miniaturisation for commercial applications in AUVs is required [5] . III Built around an error state extended Kalman filter, the system is able to utilise measurements from a wide range of aiding sensors. The core system uses a low drift Doppler velocity log (DVL) and a pressure sensor in addition to an inertial measuring unit (IMU). For most applications, a 1 nmi/h class IMU is used. Various position aiding techniques are available to counter the position error growth from the DVL aided INS. This includes ultra-short baseline (USBL) acoustic positioning from a surface vessel [8] , underwater transponder positioning (UTP) using pre-deployed acoustic transponders at known locations [6] , terrain-referenced navigation using a pre-existing bathymetric map [9] [10], or periodic surfacing for GPS updates. These techniques have complementary features, but they may still be insufficient for some demanding applications such as covert operations in unknown areas.
In some cases, no position aiding source will be available for extended periods of time and the navigation system will then depend solely on velocity aiding. In Conceptually, decision autonomy can be divided into two categories: The ability to handle internal malfunctions (sustainability) -and the ability to handle unpredictable external events. The latter is important for optimizing mission execution by adaptive, real-time mission planning based on e.g. observed bathymetry and sea current conditions. It also facilitates novel applications such as adaptive data collection and co-operation with other vehicles. Sustainability is vital to realize both long-endurance missions, as the probability of sub-system failures increases with mission duration, and missions in extreme environments, e.g. under ice, where consequences of failures may be unacceptable. In all cases, actions must be chosen so that the overall mission goals are achieved to best degree possible. These actions may include modifying the mission plan, and algorithms for automated replanning are thus required.
Goal driven mission management systems produce a mission plan based on the overall mission objectives together with relevant constraints and prior knowledge of the mission area. The implementation of such a system is the main focus of FFI's AUV autonomy programme. A hybrid control architecture has been selected, consisting of a deliberate, a reactive and an intermediate executive layer . This solution fits well into the existing HUGIN system [17] . A top-layer motion planner will be implemented.
Using existing well-proven software as a starting point reduces the effort required for implementation and debugging. It also facilitates a stepwise development approach, where new features can be tested at sea early in the process. While extensive testing can be performed in simulations, there is no substitute for testing AUV subsystems in their natural environment -the sea. This has been one of the main principles of the HUGIN development programme, and an important reason for its success.
A framework for autonomy has been designed and will be implemented this year, and integrated with the existing HUGIN control and mission management system. Among the first features to be integrated based on this framework are an advanced anti-collision system [18] , and automated surfacing for GPS position updates. In this way, incremental steps will be taken towards a complete goal driven mission management system. Automated mission planning will also be beneficial for mission preparation, simplifying the work of the operator and reducing the risk of mission failure due to human errors.
There are furthermore several cross-over areas between decision autonomy (in particular, track planning) and navigation autonomy. Navigation accuracy requirements can generate constraints to the goal driven mission management system, which may in turn be handled by a number of behaviours. As a simple example, slight variations in the vehicle trajectory, such as occasional 360°turns in a long straight-line mission, may allow observability of velocity errors (by comparing expected centripetal acceleration with measured acceleration from the IMU) [6] . Another example is that the vehicle trajectory may be adjusted to ensure that previously seen seabed features or UTP transponders are within sensor range at a later stage in the same mission.
V. DIscussIoN Increasing the autonomy of AUVs will open many new markets for such vehicles -but it should also provide substantial benefits to current users: Better power sources facilitate longer endurance and/or more power-hungry sensors. Increased navigation autonomy relaxes the requirement for USBL positioning from a surface vessel, the frequency of GPS surface fixes etc. Perhaps most importantly, increased decision autonomy (including sustainability) will increase the probability of successfull completion of missions in all environments, and will also facilitate new missions and new modes of operation.
A shift from a manually programmed mission plan to a computer-generated plan based on higher-level operator input will also provide other benefits. Although graphical planning and simulation aids are used extensively with current AUVs, human errors in the planning phase still account for a significant portion of unsuccessful AUV missions. Increasing the automation in the mission planning process and elevating the human operator to a defining and supervisory role will eliminate certain types of errors.
0-933957-35-1 ©2007 MTS
